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In May 2015 in United Arab Emirates, asymptomatic Middle 
East respiratory syndrome coronavirus infection was identi-
fied through active case finding in 2 men with exposure to 
infected dromedaries. Epidemiologic and virologic findings 
suggested zoonotic transmission. Genetic sequences for 
viruses from the men and camels were similar to those for 
viruses recently detected in other countries.
Middle East respiratory syndrome (MERS) coronavi-rus (MERS-CoV) was first detected in humans in 
2012 (1). Before 2015, most human infections occurred on 
the Arabian Peninsula. However, the recent occurrence of 
MERS in South Korea indicates that this pathogen can cause 
major outbreaks in other regions (2). Dromedaries are be-
lieved to be a source of MERS-CoV (3,4), but only a few 
case reports provide virologic and epidemiologic evidence 
that directly supports zoonotic transmission of the virus from 
dromedaries to humans (5–7). We report the detection of epi-
demiologically linked MERS-CoV infection in 2 men who 
had direct contact with infected dromedaries (8,9).
The Study
A 29-year-old man (contact 1) transported 8 dromedaries 
from Oman to United Arab Emirates on May 7, 2015 (Table 
1). The same day, as part of a national policy for control-
ling MERS, samples were collected from the dromedaries 
at a screening center located at the United Arab Emirates 
border. The samples were tested by reverse transcription 
PCR (RT-PCR) on May 10 and found to be positive for the 
MERS-CoV open reading frame (ORF) 1A and upstream 
of E genes (10). This finding led local public health au-
thorities to conduct active surveillance on humans who had 
contact with the infected dromedaries.
A sputum sample collected from contact 1 on May 10, 
2015, was tested by RT-PCR on May 12 and found to be 
positive for MERS-CoV; the man was admitted to a hospi-
tal the same day. Follow-up respiratory samples obtained 
on May 13 and 14 were still RT-PCR–positive, but a sam-
ple obtained on May 18 was negative. The patient was as-
ymptomatic at hospital admission and throughout his hos-
pital stay (online Technical Appendix, http://wwwnc.cdc.
gov/EID/article/21/12/15-1132-Techapp1.pdf).
Contact 2 was a 33-year-old man who worked at the 
screening center mentioned above. He had direct contact 
with the same group of infected dromedaries during the sam-
pling procedures. A nasal aspirate sample was obtained from 
the man on May 14, 2015, and found to be RT-PCR positive 
for MERS-CoV. Contact 2 was hospitalized on May 18. A 
follow-up sample obtained on May 18 was RT-PCR nega-
tive for MERS-CoV. Contact 2 was asymptomatic through-
out his hospitalization (online Technical Appendix).
Samples from 32 other persons were also tested by RT-
PCR (online Technical Appendix). None tested positive.
After the initial positive test results, the dromedaries 
were quarantined. Seven days later (May 14), follow-up 
nasal swab samples from 5 dromedaries were still positive 
by RT-PCR (Table 2); the animals also had mucopurulent 
nasal discharge. The animals were tested for the presence of 
MERS-CoV–specific neutralizing antibodies (11); all were 
seropositive. Two 4-month-old calves (ADFCA-HKU1 and 
ADFCA-HKU2) had the highest virus loads by real-time 
RT-PCR and the lowest neutralizing antibody titers (Table 
2). Nasal swab samples from these 2 dromedaries were also 
MERS-CoV–positive by rapid antigen testing (12), which 
suggests the calves were still shedding virus 7 days after 
the first detection of v irus. Virus culture was not attempted. 
On May 25, 2015, the 2 calves were RT-PCR negative for 
MERS-CoV, and the whole group of camels was released 
from quarantine.
Respiratory specimens from the 2 infected humans 
and the 5 dromedaries that were still positive at the second 
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sampling were analyzed by dideoxy sequencing as previ-
ously described (13); the nucleocapsid gene sequences of 
all dromedary samples were found to be identical. Samples 
from dromedaries ADFCA-HKU1–3 were selected for 
further analysis, and a sequence contig encompassing the 
3′ end of the ORF1AB gene through the 3′ untranslated 
region of the MERS-CoV genome (≈8,900 nt; sequence 
coverage 4) was obtained from each sample. Contigs from 
the 3 samples were identical, with the exception of a V221I 
(GTT→ATT) mutation in the ORF4b protein of the sample 
from dromedary ADFCA-HKU2. The viral RNA content 
of the 2 human samples available for analysis was too low 
to provide long PCR amplicons (cycle threshold 35.5 and 
36.9 by upstream of E gene assay). However, partial se-
quences of MERS-CoV spike (466 nt, contacts 1 and 2), 
ORF3–4a (273 nt, contact 1), and nucleocapsid (451 nt, 
contacts 1 and 2) gene regions could be detected from the 
samples. All of these sequences were identical to those de-
duced from the dromedary specimens. Genomic sequences 
determined from this study were submitted to GenBank 
(accession nos. KT275306–KT275315).
The 3 sequence contigs obtained from the drom-
edary samples were phylogenetically closely related to 
those of viruses detected in humans in the Saudi Arabia, 
China, and South Korea in 2015 (Figure). All sequences 
from this cluster, together with the partial ORF3–4a se-
quence detected in the sample from contact 1, shared 2 
cluster-specific mutations, 79S (TCA→TCT) and P86L 
(CCT→CTT), in the ORF3 protein, suggesting that 
these viruses may share a common lineage. Apart from 
the unique V221I mutation, the sequences for viruses 
from the 3 dromedaries shared a unique ORF4a-Q102E 
(GAG→CAG) mutation that was not found in any pub-
lished MERS-CoV genomes. Other than those mutations, 
 
 
 
Table 1. A chronology of major events in a study of asymptomatic MERS-CoV infection in 2 humans after direct contact with infected 
dromedary camels imported from Oman to United Arab Emirates, May 2015* 
Date, May 2015 Event 
7 Contact 1 transported 8 dromedaries from Oman to the United Arab Emirates border. Contact 2 had direct contact 
with the dromedaries during sampling procedures at the camel screening center at the border. All 8 dromedaries 
were quarantined until test results were available on May 10. 
10 All 8 dromedaries were found to be RT-PCR positive for MERS-CoV and were quarantined in a separate structure 
located at the same border location. Active surveillance of persons with direct or indirect contact with the infected 
dromedaries was initiated. A sputum sample was obtained from contact 1; it tested positive for MER-CoV by RT-
PCR on 12 May, 2015. 
12 A sample obtained from contact 1 on May 10 tested positive for MERS-CoV by RT-PCR; contact 1 was hospitalized 
in a negative-pressure room. 
13 A follow-up sample was obtained from contact 1, and it tested positive for MERS by RT-PCR.† 
14 A follow-up sample was obtained from contact 1, and it tested positive for MERS by RT-PCR. A nasal aspirate 
sample was obtained from contact 2; it tested positive for MERS by RT-PCR on May 17.† Samples were obtained 
from the infected dromedaries, and 5 were still MERS-CoV–positive by RT-PCR (Table 2).† 
17 A sample obtained from contact 2 on May 14 tested positive for MERS-CoV by RT-PCR. 
18 Contact 2 was admitted to a negative-pressure room in the same hospital as contact 1. Follow-up samples were 
obtained from contacts 1 and 2, and they tested negative for MERS-CoV by RT-PCR. 
20 A follow-up sample was obtained from contact 2, and it tested negative for MERS-CoV by RT-PCR. 
21 A follow-up sample was obtained from contact 2, and it tested negative for MERS-CoV by RT-PCR. 
25 Follow-up samples from the 5 dromedaries tested negative for MERS-CoV by RT-PCR. All dromedaries were 
released from quarantine. 
End of month‡ Contacts 1 and 2 were released uneventfully from the hospital. 
*Contacts 1 and 2, humans who had direct physical contact with infected dromedaries; MERS-CoV, Middle East respiratory syndrome; RT-PCR, reverse 
transcription PCR. 
†Samples subjected to sequencing analyses. 
‡Exact date unknown.  
 
 
 
 
Table 2. Demographic data and clinical test results for MERS-CoV–infected dromedary camels imported from Oman to United Arab 
Emirates, May 2015* 
Camel ID Age/sex 
Purpose of 
importation 
Mucopurulent nasal 
discharge† 
Test results 
RT-PCR (Ct)†‡ 
Rapid antigen 
test†§ 
Serum neutralizing 
antibody titer†¶ 
ADFCA-HKU1 4 m/F Breeding Moderate Pos (24.54) Pos 1:40 
ADFCA-HKU2 4 m/F Breeding Moderate Pos (27.59) Pos 1:40 
ADFCA-HKU3 4 m/F Breeding Moderate Pos (28.82) Neg 1:80 
ADFCA-HKU4 7 m/F Breeding Moderate Pos (29.81) Neg 1:80 
ADFCA-HKU5 10 y/F Breeding Mild Pos (30.05) Neg 1:160 
*Ct, cycle threshold; ID, identification; MERS-CoV, Middle East respiratory syndrome; Neg, negative; Pos, positive; RT-PCR, reverse transcription PCR. 
†Observations or samples from the second sampling on May 14, 2015. 
‡Results were determined by open reading frame 1A and upstream of E gene RT-PCR assays; Ct values were from the open reading frame 1A assay. Ct 
values from both assays were comparable (data not shown). 
§Results were determined by immunochromatographic tests for MERS-CoV nucleocapsid protein (12). 
¶Results were determined by pseudoparticle neutralization assays (11). 
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Figure. Phylogenetic analyses 
of partial Middle East respiratory 
syndrome coronavirus (MERS-
CoV) genomic sequences for 
viruses detected in dromedaries 
imported from Oman to United 
Arab Emirates, May 2015. A partial 
viral RNA sequence spanning 
the 3′  end of the open reading 
frame 1AB gene through the 3′  
untranslated region of the MERS-
CoV genome (≈8,900 nt) was used 
in the analysis. The phylogenetic 
tree was constructed with MEGA6 
software (http://www.megasoftware.
net/) by using the neighbor-joining 
method. Numbers at nodes indicate 
bootstrap values determined by 
1,000 replicates. Only bootstrap 
values >70 are denoted. 
Underlining indicates sequences 
for viruses detected in this study. 
GenBank accession numbers are 
shown for published sequences. 
Symbols indicate MERS-CoVs 
detected from dromedaries. Scale 
bar indicates the estimated genetic 
distance of these viruses.
all of the ORFs (nonstructural protein 13, spike, ORF3, 
ORF5, envelope, membrane, nucleocapsid, and ORF8b) 
of these virus sequences were unremarkable.
Conclusions
We report 2 cases of MERS-CoV infection in men who had 
direct contact with the same group of infected dromedaries. 
Neither man had a concurrent medical condition or a his-
tory of exposure to human MERS cases in the 14 days be-
fore their first MERS-CoV–positive test results. Genomic 
sequences for the viruses derived from the men and drom-
edaries and findings from the epidemiologic investigation 
suggest possible zoonotic transmission of MERS-CoV 
from dromedaries to humans. Although it is unlikely, we 
cannot exclude the possibility that the men and dromedar-
ies were independently infected by other sources.
Both infected humans were kept in the hospital for ≈2 
incubation periods and were asymptomatic during this pe-
riod. Clinical observations and positive RT-PCR results 
suggest that the men were asymptomatically infected with 
MERS-CoV. Asymptomatic infections have been detected 
previously (14). Our findings provide further evidence that 
asymptomatic human infections can be caused by zoonotic 
transmission. It is not clear whether asymptomatic infection 
can lead to transmission between humans. Nonetheless, our 
findings highlight the importance of systematic surveillance 
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of persons who have frequent contact with dromedaries. A 
recent study demonstrated that persons who have frequent 
exposure to camels are more likely than the general popu-
lation to be seropositive for MERS-CoV (4). The unique 
border screening program and multisectoral collaborations 
highlighted in this investigation serve as a model for effec-
tive MERS-CoV surveillance at the animal–human interface.
Our study had some limitations. We did not test serum 
samples from the human contacts; such testing would be 
of interest for follow-up investigation of the patients’ se-
rologic responses. We also obtained limited RNA samples 
from these persons, which prevented us from conducting 
more extensive viral sequence analyses.
MERS-CoV genomic sequences determined in this 
study are similar to those of viruses detected in 2015 in 
patients in Saudi Arabia and South Korea with hospital-
acquired infections. The infected dromedaries in this study 
were imported from Oman, which suggests that viruses 
from this clade are widely circulating on the Arabian Pen-
insula. Sequence analyses of MERS-CoVs found in South 
Korea and China do not suggest that viruses from this clade 
are necessarily more transmissible variants (15). However, 
given that a single introduction of MERS-CoV from this 
clade caused >180 human infections in hospital settings (2) 
and that viruses of this clade are causing other human infec-
tions in Saudi Arabia, further phenotypic risk assessment of 
this particular MERS-CoV clade should be a priority.
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